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Review Essay 
Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012) 
Kenneth Noe 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale 
It  would  take  little  argument  to  show  that  Daniel  W.  Smith’s  work  
on   the  great  French  philosopher  Gilles  Deleuze   (1925-­‐‑1995)   is  owed  a  debt  
by   English-­‐‑speaking   readers   of   Deleuze   that   is   difficult   to   overstate.   Over  
the  past  15  years,  Professor  Smith  has  not  only  translated  some  of  the  most  
important   works   by   the   French   thinker   –   among   them   Essays   Critical   and  
Clinical   (with   Michael   Greco,   1997),1   Francis   Bacon:   The   Logic   of   Sensation  
(2003),2   and   Deleuze’s   early   1963   essay   “The   Idea   of   Genesis   in   Kant’s  
Aesthetics”3   –   but   has   also   bequeathed   to   a   new   generation   of   Deleuze  
readership   a   penetrating   and   remarkably   lucid   interpretation   of   Deleuze’s  
philosophical  system,  an  interpretation  that  is  at  once  sensitive  to  Deleuze’s  
unique  conceptual  development,  as  well  as  his  intimate  relationship  with  the  
history   of   philosophy.   Until   recently,   Professor   Smith’s   work   has   been  
dispersed   throughout   a   multitude   of   various   philosophical   venues,   from  
journal  articles  and  book  chapters  to  introductory  essays  accompanying  his  
Deleuze  translations.  Essays  on  Deleuze  finally  gathers  this  work  together  in  a  
single  volume,4  presenting  these  essays  along  a  more  unified  trajectory  that  
both   records   Smith’s   significant   contribution   to  Deleuze   studies  while   also  
laying  foundations  for  new  avenues  of  research.  
The  essays  are  organized  into  four  main  headings,  each  focusing  on  
a   particular   aspect   of   Deleuze’s   philosophy:   Deleuze   and   the   History   of  
Philosophy,   Deleuze’s   Philosophical   System   (which   contains   a   new   essay  
entitled  “On  the  Becoming  of  Concepts”),  Five  Deleuzian  Concepts  (Desire,  
Life,  Sensation,  The  New,  and  The  Open,  which  contains  a  second  new  essay  
entitled   “The   Idea   of   the   Open:   Bergson’s   Theses   on   Movement”),   and  
Deleuze   and   Contemporary   Philosophy,   where   Deleuze’s   philosophy   is  
examined   in   relation   to   five  contemporary   figures:  Derrida,  Badiou,  Lacan,  
Klossowski,  and   the  political  philosophy  of  Paul  Patton.  The  ample  wealth  
of  material  presented  over   the   course  of   these  20   essays   (466  pp.)   is  vastly  
impossible  to  represent  adequately  in  this  review,  so  in  what  follows  I’d  like  
to  focus  on  what  I  take  to  be  one  of  Smith’s  most  original  and  characteristic  
approaches   for   the   framing   of   Deleuze’s   overall   philosophical   project,  
namely,   the   important   ways   in   which   Deleuze’s   philosophy   is   a   direct  
response  to  Kant  and  post-­‐‑Kantian  critical  philosophy.5  Specifically,  Smith’s  
work  clearly  identifies  the  ways  in  which  Deleuze  develops  the  resources  in  
Kant’s  philosophy  for  posing  the  problem  of  the  new,  or  more  precisely  still,  
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the   transcendental  conditions  of   the  richness  of  experiential  novelty.  While  
the  Kantian  inheritance  of  this  theme  appears  in  just  about  every  essay  in  the  
collection,   I  will  concentrate  on  a  small  cluster  of  essays   that  perhaps  most  
thoroughly   develop   it:   Essay   4   (“Deleuze,   Hegel,   and   the   Post-­‐‑Kantian  
Tradition”),  essay  5  (“Logic  and  Existence:  Deleuze  on  the  Conditions  of  the  
Real”),   essay   6   (“Deleuze’s   Theory   of   Sensation:   Overcoming   the   Kantian  
Duality”),   essay   7   (“Deleuze,   Kant,   and   the   Theory   of   Immanent   Ideas”),  
essay   8   (“On   the   Becoming   of   Concepts,”   previously   unpublished),   and  
essay   9   (“The   Place   of   Ethics   in  Deleuze’s   Philosophy:   Three  Questions   of  
Immanence”).  
“Deleuze,  Hegel,  and  the  Post-­‐‑Kantian  Tradition”  provides  a  short  
defense  of  the  view  that  Deleuze  is  much  more  the  dialectical  thinker  than  is  
often   assumed.   While   the   context   which   initiated   Deleuze’s   philosophical  
development  occasioned  a  sustained  polemic  against  Hegel  –  the  presumed  
doorway   through   which   all   subsequent   philosophy   must   pass   –   Smith  
argues  that  it  is  not  dialectics  as  such  that  are  the  object  of  Deleuze’s  enmity;  
it   is   rather   a   dialectics   framed   by   negation   and   contradiction  
(“Hegelianism”),  which  Deleuze  views  as  a   reduction  of   real   experience   to  
subsumptive   structures   that   preclude   novelty.   As   Smith   suggests,   the  
polemics   against   Hegel   are   more   properly   understood   in   the   context   of  
Deleuze’s  more  profound  re-­‐‑imagining  of  the  trajectory  of  the  post-­‐‑Kantian  
tradition,  and  should  therefore  be  understood  in   light  of   the  broader  scope  
which   forms   the   intellectual   basis   for  Difference   and   Repetition,6   the   fourth  
chapter  of  which  develops  Deleuze’s  own  theory  of  a  dialectic  of  difference  
based  on  a  complex  theory  of  “differential”  Ideas.     
“Deleuze,   Kant,   and   the   Theory   of   Immanent   Ideas”   bridges   this  
historical   theme  with   its  more  properly   conceptual   register  by  providing  a  
reading  of  Deleuze’s  genetic  and  differential   theory  of   Ideas   (on  which  his  
concept   of   dialectics   is   based).   Smith’s   approach   in   this   essay   is   to   place  
Deleuze  directly  in  line  with  Kant  in  order  to  show  how  Deleuze’s  theory  is  
crucially  developed  out   of   the   theory  of   Ideas   the   former   constructs   in  his  
three   critiques,   arguing   for   Deleuze’s   heavy   indebtedness   not   only   to  
Salomon   Maimon’s   theory   of   “differentials   of   experience”   –   which  
historically  presents  the  first  substantial  response  to  Kant’s  intuition-­‐‑concept  
dualism   –   but   also   to   Kant’s   own   third  Critique.   In   the   latter,   the   Ideas   of  
reason   (as   “aesthetic   ideas”)   go   far   beyond   their   merely   regulative   role  
assigned   in   the   first   Critique,   and   become   the   key   elements   in   a   genetic  
account  of  the  imagination’s  freedom  from  the  determinate  legislation  of  the  
understanding.   Smith   argues   that   when   Deleuze   finally   turns   back   to  
Leibniz  for  resources  for  his  own  theory  of  Ideas,  he  does  so  in  a  decidedly  
post-­‐‑Kantian  fashion,  since  Deleuze’s  central  problem,  as  it  was  for  Maimon,  
concerns   the   overcoming   of   the   Kantian   duality   between   sensibility   and  
conceptual  understanding:  either  concepts  are  sensible  (as  in  Locke)  or  sense  
experience   is   ultimately   intelligible   (as   in   Leibniz).   Following   Maimon,  
Deleuze  will  choose  the  latter  path,  developing  a  theory  of  immanent  Ideas  
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as   multiplicities   that   develop   through   a   complex   non-­‐‑teleological  
temporality.   Deleuzian   Ideas   are   therefore   not   essences   (in   the   simplistic  
sense   of   self-­‐‑identical   universals),   but   are   rather   more   like   generative  
processes   (events,   becomings)   that   effect   internal   variations   within   real  
experience.7  Tempered  by  the  critical  lead  of  both  Maimon  as  well  as  Kant’s  
third  Critique,  Deleuze  thus  appropriates  from  Leibniz  a  theory  of  the  Idea  as  
an  object  of  a  purely  immanent  determination:  While  an  Idea  is  completely  
undetermined,   it   is   in  principle  determinable  in  the  differential  elements  of  
experience,8   which   when   actualized   produces   a   singularity,   a   multiplicity  
that   is   unique,   different,   and   new.   This   “structure”   of   Ideas   thereby   gives  
them   a   creative   power,   a   genuine   productive   potentiality   that   serves   as   a  
necessary  condition  for  the  richness  of  intensive  real  experience,  our  closest  
approximation  to  the  real.  
Continuing   this   theme,   “Logic   and   Existence:   Deleuze   on   the  
Conditions  of  the  Real”  is  a  refreshing  essay  that  camps  on  a  variation  of  this  
problem,  which  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  Deleuze’s  project:  namely,  how  it  is  
that   philosophy  might   leave   the   sphere   of   the  merely   possible   in   order   to  
think   the   real,   that   is,   to   think   the   aesthetic   complexity   of   actual   existence.  
Adopting  a  cinematographic  metaphor,  Smith   takes   the   reader   (or  perhaps  
the   “viewer”)   through   a   three-­‐‑part   narrative   in   which   the   relationship  
between   logic   and   existence   is   framed   by   three   philosophical   contexts:  
Leibniz,  Hegel,  and  the  existentialists.  In  brief,  scene  one:  Leibniz,  adopting  
the  principle  of  identity,  argues  that  existence  can  be  thought  with  a  theory  
of   complete   concepts   (“truth   belongs   to   analytic   propositions”),   extending  
the   principle   of   identity   into   the   infinite   richness   of   concrete   particularity.  
Consequently,   the   logical  predicates  of   complete  concepts  not  only   include  
properties,  attributes,  and  other  substantial  determinations,  but  also  include  
events   and   spatio-­‐‑temporal   determinations   –   e.g.,   the   event   “crossing   the  
Rubicon”   is  no   longer  a  merely  contingent  attribute,  but  rather  a  necessary  
part  of  the  complete  concept  of  “Caesar.”  Such  is  the  principle  of  identity  in  
Leibniz’s   hands:   A   thing   is   what   it   is,   all   the   way   down   to   its   specified  
singularity,  because  a  complete  concept  determines   it   to  be  so   in  principle.  
Next,  scene  two:  the  post-­‐‑Kantian  tradition  culminates  in  Hegel,  who  adopts  
the  principle  of  non-­‐‑contradiction  in  order  to  think  existence.  Famously,  the  
Hegelian   logic   thinks   existence   as   the   process   of   an   unraveling   and  
resolution  of  contradictions  present   in   the  experience  of  consciousness.  But  
as   Smith   observes,   when   Hegel   says   that   things   do   not   contradict  
themselves,   he   is  ultimately   saying   something  about   things,   i.e.,   something  
about   the   nature   of   existence   itself   rather   than   mere   abstract   logical  
principles  –  and,  more  deeply,  about  the  ways  in  which  things  are  born  and  
develop   (79).   Thus   on   the   Hegelian   view   it   is   the   principle   of   non-­‐‑
contradiction   that   lies   at   the   heart   of   existence.   Finally,   scene   three:   the  
existentialist  “either...or.”  The  existentialist  describes  existence  as  the  source  
of   a   choice   or   decision,   or   the   mode   of   the   alternative   rather   than   the  
negative,  in  Smith’s  words  (80).  In  existentialism,  then,  the  law  of  excluded  
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middle   lies   at   the  heart  of  being   (Hamlet’s   “to  be  or  not   to  be   /   that   is   the  
question”).  To  exist   is   to  be   in  question,  as   the  source  of  a  decision,  and  to  
think  –  or  to  think  in  this  way  rather  than  that  way  –  is  a  choice,  and  thus,  as  
Smith   says   of   Kierkegaard,   “decision   or   choice   covers   as   great   an   area   as  
thought  itself”  (80).  
Smith’s   narrative   places   Deleuze   at   the   crossroads   of   these  
philosophical  projects.   But  while  Deleuze   takes   an   interest   in  precisely   the  
same  question  that  motivates  these  projects  –  that  is,  how  thought  can  think  
at   the   level  of  existence   itself  –  Deleuze’s  answer  will  be  very  different,  an  
answer  which  shapes   the  entire  project  of  Difference  and  Repetition:  namely,  
that  principles  of   identity,  contradiction,  and  excluded  middle  all  share  the  
basic  assumption  that  difference  is  derivative  of,  and  therefore  reducible  to,  
identity.  And  so  what  we  need,  as  Deleuze  argues,  is  a  form  of  thought  that  
does   not   impose   its   own   principles   on   existence   (identity),   but   rather  
discovers  the  principle  within  the  richness  and  multiplicity  of  existence  itself  
(a  principle  of  difference).    
One   of   Smith’s   earliest   published   works,   “Deleuze’s   Theory   of  
Sensation:  Overcoming  the  Kantian  Duality,”  further  develops  the  problem  
of  experiential  novelty  by  focusing  on  the  nature  of  real  sensation,  arguing  
that  Deleuze’s   theory   of   sensation   is   an   attempt   to   surpass   the   intractable  
dualism  of  aesthetics  inherited  in  the  wake  of  Kant:  aesthetics  as  the  form  of  
sensibility   of   possible   experience   and   aesthetics   as   the   theory   of   art   as  
reflection   on   real   experience.9   By  distinguishing  between   real   and  possible  
experience,   Deleuze   endeavors   to   show   that   the   genetic   elements   of   real  
sensation  intersect  with  the  creative  process  of  artistic  expression,  such  that  
art  becomes  much  more  than  the  mere  representation  of  experience,  but  is  in  
fact   a   mode   of   creating   the   affects   that   can   both   generate   particular  
experiences   and   challenge   received   understandings   of   experience   (“art   as  
experience,”  as  the  great  John  Dewey  would  say).  First,  Smith  undertakes  an  
analysis  of  Deleuze’s  often  obscure  theory  of  “signs,”  which  for  Deleuze  are  
not   objects   of   recognition   (in   the  Kantian   sense)   but   objects   of   an   encounter,  
that   is,   the  bearer  of  a  problem  that   forces   thought   to   think  that  which  can  
only   be   sensed.10   Deleuze   will   argue   that   works   of   art   are   themselves  
explorations   of   these   “problematizing”   elements   in   sensation.   Far   from  
producing  recognizable  objects,  true  works  of  art  aim  at  producing  a  “pure  
being   of   sensation,”   i.e.,   a   sign   that   provokes   a   problem   in   thought.11  
Therefore,   as  Smith  argues,   “the  genetic  principles  of   sensation  are   thus  at  
the   same   time   the   principles   of   composition   of   the   work   of   art;   and  
conversely,  it  is  the  structure  of  the  work  of  art  that  reveals  these  conditions”  
(98).   In   this   way,   Smith   provides   further   insight   into   both   the   historical  
trajectory   of   Deleuze’s   theory   of   sensation   as   a   solution   to   the   dualism  
inherent   in   Kant’s   aesthetic,   as   well   as   the   ways   in   which   the   nature   of  
sensation  can  be  problematized  from  a  Deleuzian  point  of  view.  
In   a   Nietzschean   spirit,   “The   Place   of   Ethics   in   Deleuze’s  
Philosophy:   Three  Questions   of   Immanence”   argues   that  Deleuze’s   ethical  
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task  aims  to  purge  ethics  from  all  appeals  to  transcendent  concepts,  that  is,  
concepts   such   as   “the   Good,”   “the   virtuous   life,”   or   “the  moral   law”   that  
judge  the  moral  worth  of  actions  based  on  external  criteria  (“morality”  in  the  
Nietzschean   sense).   By   contrast,   an   ethics   of   immanence   evaluates   thought  
and  action  in  accordance  with  “the  immanent  mode  of  existence”  implied  in  
the   act   (147).  What   is   the  mode  of   existence   that   serves   as   the  principle   of  
this  or  that  action?  As  Deleuze  observes,  it  was  in  fact  Kant  who  first  paved  
the   way   for   the   immanent   critique   of   morality,   since   Kant   reversed   the  
traditional   relationship   between   the   Good   and   the   law:   It   is   not   the  
transcendent  Good  that  serves  to  determine  moral  principles  and  laws,  it  is  
rather   the   fact   of   the  moral   law   that   serves   as   a   test,   a   tool   for   evaluation  
from  which  we   determine  what   is   good.  On  Deleuze’s   reading,   this  move  
represents   the   third  great  Kantian  reversal   in  philosophy:   It   is   the   law  that  
precedes  the  good,  and  not  vice  versa.12  Yet  at  the  very  moment  he  prepares  
it,   Kant   fails   to   push   the   immanent   critique   of   morality   to   its   ultimate  
conclusion.   Indeed,   Kant   reintroduces   moral   transcendence   in   two   ways:  
First,   the   moral   law   becomes   the   “fact”   of   morality,   the   transcendent  
universalizability   criteria   by   which   all   actions   are   judged   (the   first  
formulation   of   the   categorical   imperative).   Second,   the   postulates   of   pure  
reason   (God,   the   soul,   the   cosmos),   which   in   the   first   Critique   Kant   so  
carefully  dismantled  as  illusions  of  pure  reason  from  the  speculative  point  of  
view,  are  resurrected  in  the  context  of  practical  reason  as  postulates  of  moral  
fulfillment.  Through  a  subtle  fusion  of  Spinoza  and  Nietzsche,  Smith  argues,  
Deleuze   will   develop   the   full   implications   of   an   immanent   critique   of  
morality  by  reformulating  the  problem  of  ethics  at   the   intersection  of   three  
questions:  (1)  How  is  a  mode  of  existence  determined?  (2)  How  are  modes  of  
existence  to  be  evaluated?  (3)  What  are  the  conditions  for  the  creation  of  new  
modes  of   existence?  Finally,   it   is   argued   that   far   from  any   subjectivistic   or  
relativistic   ethics   –  which   is   often   lamented   in   the   absence  of   transcendent  
and  universal   standards  of  moral   judgment  –  Deleuze   turns   to   concepts  of  
power  and  affect  as  purely  immanent  criteria  of  ethical  evaluation  (147-­‐‑48).    
Also   present   in   this   volume   is   one   important   new   essay   which  
develops   a   reading   of   Deleuze’s   “Analytic   of   Concepts,”   entitled   “On   the  
Becoming   of   Concepts.”   Among   the   longest   papers   in   the   collection,   this  
essay   shines   against   the   backdrop   of   the   previously   published   and   more  
established  essays   in   the  volume.  One   thread  of   this  particular  essay   that   I  
would  like  to  examine  a  bit  more  in-­‐‑depth  is  Smith’s  process  oriented  thesis  
that  Deleuze’s  theory  of  concepts  aims  “to  introduce  the  pure  form  of  time  into  
concepts,   in   the   form   of   what   he   calls   ‘continuous   variation’   or   ‘pure  
variability’”   (130).  With   this   thesis,   Smith   takes   the   reader   through   a   brief  
but  detailed  discussion  of  Deleuze’s  philosophy  of   time,  a  subject   that  was  
heretofore   only   minimally   explored   in   Smith’s   own   published   work.   On  
Deleuze’s   reading,   time   takes   on   a   completely   new   structure   in   the  
philosophy   of  Kant,  who   liberates   time   from   its   classical   determination   as  
the  measure  of  movement.  With  Deleuze,  Smith  observes  that  from  antiquity  
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to  the  seventeenth  century,  time  was  conceived  as  subordinate  to  movement  
as   the   basis   for   its   intelligibility.   In   Plato’s   Timaeus,   for   example,   time   is  
presented  as   the   image  of   eternity,   the   latter   conceived  as   the  unchanging,  
the   permanent   (time   as   “a   moving   image   of   eternity”13).   In   Aristotle’s  
Physics,  we  find  time  famously  defined  as  the  “number  of  motion  in  respect  
of   ‘before’  and   ‘after.’”14  And   in  Plotinus,  “a  hierarchization  of  movements  
depending  on  their  proximity  or  distance  from  the  eternal”  exhibits  a  similar  
image   of   time   as   subordinate   to  movement,   namely,   that   it   is   in   time   that  
mere  images  of  the  true  reside,  while  the  truth  in  itself  remains  timeless  and  
unchanging,   unsubordinated   to   the   temporal  movements   that   characterize  
the  sensible  world  (131).  
It  wasn’t  until  Kant  that  time  achieved  an  autonomy  of  its  own  as  a  
condition   for   the   possibility   of   knowledge   as   such   –   thereby   effecting   the  
famous  Kantian  redistribution  of  the  traditional  objects  of  metaphysics  (God,  
the   immortal   soul,   the   cosmos)   as   transcendent   illusions   internal   to   the  
interests  of  pure  reason.  Knowledge,  the  good,  the  experience  of  beauty,  or  
ideas   of   the   just   society   all   become   particular   relationships   within   time,  
rather  than  images  or  models  of  the  eternal  or  unchanging.  Indeed,  there  is  
an   important   sense   in  which   this   first   great   Kantian   reversal   provides   the  
foundation   for  all   of  Kant’s   critiques  and   subsequent  doctrines.15  As  Smith  
observes,  Deleuze  is  very  clear  on  our  debt  to  Kant  for  opening  the  first  real  
passage   into   the   possibility   of   conceiving   an   empty   form  of   time,   that   is,   a  
conception  of  time  that  is  not  dependent  on  movement,  but  rather  becomes  a  
pure   and   immutable   form   of   everything   that   does   move   and   change:   as  
Deleuze  ponders,  “not  an  eternal  form,  but  precisely  the  form  of  what  is  not  
eternal,  the  immutable  form  of  change  and  movement.”16  Indeed,  it  becomes  
clear   that  a  profound  mystery  of   time   is  disclosed   in  Kant’s   liberation,  one  
that  treats  of  time  as  both  absolute  and  variable.  This  mystery  is  due  in  part  
to  the  fact  that,  as  Smith  says  with  Deleuze,  the  immutable  and  unchanging  
form   of   time   cannot   even   be   described   as   “permanent,”   “since   what   is  
permanent  –  no  less  than  what  is  successive  or  simultaneous  –  appears  and  
is   perceived   in   time,  whereas   the   immutable   form   of   time   itself   cannot   be  
perceived”  (133).    
As   the   pure   form   of   change,   then,   it   is   the   absolute   variability   of  
time   that  will  mark  a  decisive   feature  of  Deleuze’s   theory  of   concepts.  But  
here   Deleuze  must   break  with   the   Kantian   analytic   of   concepts,   even   if   it  
was  Kant’s  own  liberation  of  time  that  opened  up  the  possibility  of  a  theory  
of   concepts   as   fractured   by   time.   This   is   because,   according   to   Smith,   the  
Kantian   synthesis   only   leaves   us   with   a   properly   active   synthesis   that  
ultimately   aims   at   recognition   in   the   concept.   Of   course,   this   relationship  
between   Kant   and   Deleuze   regarding   the   nature   of   the   syntheses   is   very  
complex,  so  I  will  only  be  able  to  address  it  in  summary  fashion.17  
Famously,   in   the   first   Critique   Kant   had   argued   that   if   genuine  
cognition   is   to  be  possible  yet  also  temporal,   it  must  be  brought  to  bear  on  
the  modes   of   time   by   fixing   the  multiplicity   of   temporal   appearances   in   a  
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linear   and   mutually   reinforcing   succession   of   past,   present,   and   future.  
Therefore,   in  order   for  knowledge   to  be  possible,   I  must   (1)   synthesize   the  
multiplicity  of  presentations  in  an  apprehension  (present);  (2)  I  must  reproduce  
what  has  come  before  by  synthesizing  them  with  what  is  now  present  (past);  
and   (3)   I   must   synthesize   the   apprehended   present   and   the   previous  
presents  with  the  presents  that  are  to  come,  that  is,  I  must  be  able  to  recognize  
what  is  to  come  through  a  concept  in  an  act  of  recognition.  Only  under  these  
conditions  can  I  come  to  know  the  object  before  me.  Kant  further  describes  
this   movement   as   (1)   the   synopsis   of   the   manifold   through   sense,   (2)   the  
synthesis   of   the   manifold   through   imagination,   and   (3)   the   unity   of   this  
synthesis  through  original  apperception  (A94).  However,  it  is  only  in  the  ‘B’  
edition   of   the   first   Critique   that   Kant   argues   that   all   combination   of   the  
manifold  (Mannigfaltigkeit)  is  an  activity  of  the  understanding  (the  power  of  
concepts),  and  hence  belongs  to  recognition.18  As  has  been  argued,  in  the  ‘A’  
edition   Kant,   if   only   implicitly,   leaves   open   the   possibility   of   a   synthesis  
brought  about  passively  or  unconsciously,  as  prior   to   the  self-­‐‑activity  of   the  
spontaneous   understanding.19   This   is   because   in   the   ‘A’   edition   the  
recognition   of   the   manifold   through   a   concept   does   not   appear   until   the  
third   synthesis,   which   leaves   the   first   two   syntheses   (apprehension   and  
reproduction)  outside   the  strictly  determinate   legislation  of   the  concepts  of  
the  understanding.  
As   Smith   argues,   Deleuze   in   his   own   way   modifies   the   Kantian  
analysis   in   this   very   direction   by   developing   the   movement   of   passive  
syntheses   that   are   not   governed   by   the   rules   of   the   active   understanding.  
More  profoundly  than  any  simple  break  with  the  Kantian  position,  Deleuze  
performs   this  modification  with   the   aim   of   rather   completing   and   thereby  
revamping   the   Kantian   transcendental   project,   in   order   to   render   possible  
the   very   moments   which   Kant   himself   presupposes:   First,   if   Kant  
presupposes   the   receptivity   of   intuition,   Deleuze’s   modification   makes   it  
possible  by   reformulating   the   first   synthesis   (of   apprehension,   the  present)  
into   a   passive   organic   and   corporeal   synthesis   of   habit;   second,   if   Kant  
presupposes   the   very   passage   of   time   itself,   Deleuze’s  modification   of   the  
second   synthesis   (of   reproduction,   the   past),   following   Bergson,   makes   it  
possible   by  positing   the  pure   past  without  which   the  passage   of   time   itself  
remains   impossible.   Finally,   one   of   the   more   crucial   differences   between  
Kant  and  Deleuze  obtains  in  the  third  synthesis  (of  recognition,  the  future),  
which   is   indeed   one   of   Deleuze’s   most   interesting   contributions   to   the  
philosophy   of   time.   “The   third   synthesis,”   Smith   observes,   “rather   than  
appealing   to   recognition,   instead   is   the   condition   for   the   production   of   the  
new”   (134).   But   how   does   Deleuze’s   third   passive   synthesis   condition   the  
production  of  the  new?  
In  his  essay,  Smith  leaves  this  question  on  the  table,  and  so  I  would  
like   to   suggest   an   answer,   if   only   in   brief.   In   keeping   with   the   Kantian  
parallel,  if  recognition  –  the  aim  of  Kant’s  third  synthesis  –  is  essentially  rule  
governed,   that   is,   governed   by   the   legislation   of   the   understanding,   then  
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Deleuze’s   third   synthesis   surely   cannot   issue   in   a   recognition,   since   for  
Deleuze  the  primary  issue  in  fact  concerns  the  very  applicability  (quid  juris)  
of   rules   to   real   experience,   that   is,   the   very   possibility   of   real   experience  
issuing  in  an  essential  transgression  of  determinate  rules  (as  Foucault  would  
perhaps   say).   Following   Deleuze,   as   Smith   observes   elsewhere   citing   the  
influence   of   Maimon,   the   demands   of   a   genetic   method   require   “the  
distinction  between  the  conditions  of  possible  experience  and  the  conditions  
of  real  experience”  (73).  Of  course,  for  his  part  Kant’s  whole  argument  in  the  
first  Critique  is  that  the  a  priori  categories  are  necessarily  applicable  to  every  
possible  object  of  experience,  and  so  it  is  in  fact  Kant’s  conception  of  possible  
experience   that   is   itself   derived   from   the   categories.   It   is   precisely   for   this  
reason   that   such   determinate   categories   are   absent   in   Deleuze,   and   so  
Deleuze’s  third  passive  synthesis  cannot  produce  a  recognition.  
Therefore,   rather   than   an   original   apperception   that   grounds   a  
recognition,  which  would  ensure  the  closure  of  time  onto  a  determinate  and  
mutually  reinforcing  succession,  we  witness  in  Deleuze  a  veritable  opening  
of  time  into  the  future  –  but  of  course  not  a  future  determined  by  a  relation  
between   a   determinate   past   and   a   determinate   present;   it   is   rather   a   pure  
future.  Deleuze’s  own  great  reversal  here  is  that  the  third  synthesis  enacts  a  
violence   upon   the   passive   (“larval,”   i.e.,   processual)   subject,   forcing   it   to  
awaken   a   dormant   faculty   of   thought   in   itself   –   thereby,   as   Deleuze   says,  
“engendering   the   act   of   thinking   within   thought   itself.”20   Rather   than   a  
critical  idealism,  then,  we  find  in  Deleuze’s  more  properly  critical  realism  the  
notion  that  thought  is  primarily  not  something  carried  out  by  the  mind,  but  
is  rather,  following  similar  language  as  Deleuze’s  rather  gnomic  definition  of  
passive   synthesis,21   something   that   occurs   in   the  mind,   not   determined   by  
either   memory   or   reflection,   and   quite   far   from   the   order   of   categorical  
determination.   In   short,   thought   is   something   that   happens   to   the   mind  
before   it   is   something   actively   carried   out   by   the  mind,   conditioned   by   a  
violence  delivered  by  the  indeterminacy  of  the  pure  future.    
Therefore,   returning   to   Smith’s   claim,   Deleuze’s   third   passive  
synthesis   forms   a   genuine   condition   for   the   production   of   the   new,   since  
there,  as  Deleuze  writes,  “[t]ime  loses  its  circular  shape  in  order  to  assume  a  
merciless   and   straight   form,”22   in  which   the   future   performs   a   continuous  
displacement   of   the   present   (habit   formation)   and   the   past   (memory  
formation),   thereby   forcing   the   real   passage   of   time.   The   influence   of   the  
Kantian  reversal  should  be  very  clear:  If  Kant  liberated  time  from  its  circular  
form,  i.e.,  as  the  image  of  the  eternal,  then  time  must  assume  a  linear  form  of  
movement  that  pushes  into  the  indeterminacy  of  the  future,  which  serves  as  
both  a  necessary  condition  for  the  genuine  movement  of  time,  as  well  as  the  
sufficient  reason  for  the  production  of  novelty  in  real  experience.    
Having   thus   explored   the   Deleuzian   structure   of   time,   which  
frames   the   analytic   of   concepts,   Smith   then   guides   the   reader   through   the  
complex   labyrinth   that   is   the  Deleuzian   concept:   a   robustly   temporal,   and  
therefore,  differential  synthetic  construct  which,  while  lacking  an  identity  in  
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the  strong  substantial  sense,  nevertheless  maintains  a  more  fluid  consistency  
that   finds   a   complement   in   an   internal   variability.  As   such,   the  Deleuzian  
concept,   it   is  argued,  fulfills   the  critical   injunction  which  forms  the  basis  of  
Deleuze’s   overall   philosophical   project,   namely,   to   properly   conceive   the  
conditions   for   the   genesis   of   the   act   of   thinking   as   primarily   creative   in  
nature,   that   is,   thinking   thought   itself   from   the   point   of   view   of   the  
conditions  of  the  new,  the  singular,  or  the  unique  –  in  short,  real  experience  
conditioned  by  pure  difference.    
The   remaining   essays  of   the  volume   treat   their   respective  matters  
with  a  similar  clarity  of  presentation.  Indeed,  throughout  these  essays  Smith  
exhibits  an  uncanny  knack  for  rendering  intuitive  some  of  the  most  obscure  
and   vexing   concepts   and   theses   in   Deleuze,   to   a   point   where   the   reader,  
upon  receiving  the  instruction,   is   left  wondering  how  the  former  confusion  
could   have   arisen   (“ah,   yes,   of   course   that’s   what   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
understand  by   flow”).  Finally,   to  conclude,  while  most  of   these  essays  have  
appeared   elsewhere   before   –   though   many   of   the   essays   have   been  
expanded   beyond   their   original   content,   updated   to   reference   additional  
literature,   and   enriched   by   the   addition   of   numerous   footnotes   and  
references   –  Essays   on  Deleuze   clearly  marks   an   important   landmark   in   the  
study   of   Deleuze’s   philosophy,   culminating   a   15-­‐‑year   period   of   Smith’s  
unique  and  highly   influential   readings  of  Deleuze.   It   is  no  exaggeration   to  
cite   the  wealth   of  material   presented  here,   ranging   from   the   explication  of  
Deleuze’s  key  concepts,  the  situating  of  Deleuze  within  the  broader  story  of  
Western   philosophy   both   historically   and   presently,   and   the   mapping   of  
future  trajectories  that  would  carry  forth  Deleuze’s  philosophical  legacy  –  all  
of  which  are  present  in  spades.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. 
Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
3 Gilles Deleuze, “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics,” trans. Daniel 
W. Smith, Angelaki 5, no. 3 (2000). 
4 It should be noted that while not everything of Smith’s work is included 
in this volume, many of the themes of the omitted essays are nevertheless 
explored in the essays collected in this volume. Notable omissions include 
“‘Knowledge of Pure Events’: A Note on Deleuze’s Analytic of Concepts, 
K e n n e t h  N o e  |  1 7 0  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.593 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which appears in Ereignis auf Französisch: Von Bergson bis Deleuze 
(München: Fink Verlag, 2004); “From the Surface to the Depths: On the 
Transition of Logic of Sense to Anti-Oedipus,” which appears in Gilles 
Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction (New York: Continuum, 2009); finally, 
“Deleuze’s Concept of the Virtual and the Critique of the Possible,” 
published in Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 4, no. 9 
(2009).   
5 In his seminal Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. 
Harding (New York: Cambridge Press, 1980), Vincent Descombes is perhaps 
the first commentator in English to suggest that “Gilles Deleuze is above 
all a post-Kantian” (152-167).  
6 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994). 
7 Of course, Deleuze will remain open to the possibility of thinking the 
nature of Ideas as “essences,” provided the conception is qualified in the 
manner suggested here: “The events and singularities of the Idea do not 
allow any positing of an essence as ‘what the thing is.’ No doubt, if one 
insists, the word ‘essence’ might be preserved, but only on condition of 
saying that the essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense; not 
simply the contrary of what is ordinarily called the essence but the 
contrary of the contrary: multiplicity is no more appearance than essence, 
no more multiple than one” (Difference and Repetition, 191). 
8 One of the more clearly presented examples of this process can be found 
in Deleuze’s The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). In a manner similar to 
Leibniz, Deleuze borrows the differential relation from calculus as a model 
with which we can analogously conceive the processes of emergent novelty 
in real experience: “[A] conscious perception is produced when at least 
two heterogeneous parts enter into a differential relation that determines 
K e n n e t h  N o e  |  1 7 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.593 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a singularity.... For example, the color green: yellow and blue can surely 
be perceived, but if their perception vanishes by dint of progressive 
diminution, they enter into a differential relation....that determines 
green. And nothing prevents either yellow or blue, each on its own 
account, from being already determined by the differential relation of two 
colors that we cannot detect” (The Fold, 88). 
9 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Charles Stivale and Mark 
Lester, ed. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 260. 
10 A clear example that Deleuze references is found in Plato’s Republic, 
specifically Socrates’ discussion of the “summoners” of thought 
(Difference and Repetition, 138, 141). See Plato, Republic, 523c. 
11 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 167. 
12 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 32-33. 
13 Plato, Complete Works, 37d. 
14 Aristotle, Physics, 219b2. 
15 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 27. 
16 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 29. 
17 For a more detailed account, see Joe Hughes’ excellent Deleuze and the 
Genesis of Representation (New York: Continuum, 2008). Hughes also 
discusses this more concisely in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A 
Reader’s Guide (New York: Continuum, 2009), 88-96. 
18 In fact, Kant seems to revoke the very possibility of a passive synthesis 
in the ‘B’ edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998). He writes: “All combination, 
whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the 
manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either of 
sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding, which 
we would designate with the general title synthesis” (B130). 
K e n n e t h  N o e  |  1 7 2  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.593 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In his lectures on genetic phenomenology, published in English as 
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, trans. Anthony J. 
Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), Husserl makes this claim of Kant. 
Witnessing a crucial lacuna in the Kantian critique, Husserl’s 
phenomenological reconstruction of transcendental aesthetics furnishes 
profound insights into the rich domain of passive synthesis, a concept 
which for Kant becomes a contradiction of terms given the explicit 
formulation of all synthesis as conceptually governed on the opening page 
of the ‘B’ deduction. Husserl suggests that Kant mistakenly rejected the 
elements of passive synthesis as merely psychological in nature. 
20 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 114. 
21 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71. 
22 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 112. 
